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Playing Catch-Up: 
The United States and Southeast Asia 
Jürgen Haacke is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. His research interests focus on the politics, security and international relations of 
Southeast Asia. His latest publication is Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional 
Forum (Routledge, 2010), co-edited with Noel M. Morada. 
Relations between Washington and Southeast Asia have received a strong boost by the incoming administration of President Barack Obama. This follows the perception and at times criticism 
both in Southeast Asia and Washington that under President Bush the United States did not always 
pay sufficient attention to the region and strengthen as much as it could have relations with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
LOOKING BACK: THE BUSH YEARS
When former President George W. Bush was in office, US policy towards Southeast Asia inspired a fair 
amount of unease. Within the region, for instance, President Bush’s distinct initial focus on counter-
terrorism, especially the notion that Southeast Asia constituted a ‘second front’ and the war in Iraq, 
raised serious concerns. After the renewed detention of Nobel Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
in May 2003, Washington exerted increasing diplomatic pressure on ASEAN to be more critical of 
the military regime in Myanmar (Burma). From 2005, US public diplomacy towards ASEAN at certain 
key junctures seemed to underline the region’s persistent weakness but also relative insignificance, 
raising questions regarding Washington’s commitment to Southeast Asia. At issue was above all the 
decision by President Bush to call off the summit with ASEAN in 2007 due to scheduling difficulties; 
but there were also two notable absences from ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meetings by 
former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. 
That said, the Bush administration was instrumental in launching a number of initiatives, such as the 
ASEAN Cooperation Plan (2002), the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (2002), the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced 
Partnership (2006), and the US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (2006). These 
initiatives have served to foster regional cooperation in several areas, particularly economic cooperation. 
In a symbolic move, Washington was also the first ASEAN dialogue partner in April 2008 to appoint an 
Ambassador to the Association. Bilateral relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia significantly 
improved under President Bush. Still, despite this overall record the Bush administration left four 
distinct impressions. First, that it had not paid enough attention to Southeast Asia. Second, that its 
relationship with ASEAN was at least partially hostage to Washington’s concerns over Burma/Myanmar. 
Third, that its preference for bilateralism came at the expense of better multilateral relations with the 
region. And fourth, that it ceded influence to China in Southeast Asia. 
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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND ASEAN
In assessing the importance of the ASEAN region, the Obama administration 
has been guided by a number of factors. Southeast Asia is home to around 600 
million people, including approximately 230 million in Indonesia, which boasts 
the world’s largest Muslim population. In global terms, Indonesia is also the third 
largest democracy and a possible political model for the wider Muslim world. 
Collectively the ASEAN countries constitute America’s fifth largest trading partner 
(US$182 billion in 2008). US investments in Southeast Asia total around US$150 
billion, more than combined cumulative figures for China and India. Southeast Asia 
straddles several strategic waterways, above all the Malacca Strait. There are thus 
very good reasons for the US to support socio-economic and political development 
as well as regional stability in Southeast Asia. From a geopolitical perspective, the 
US has also had to acknowledge that against the backdrop of China’s rise relations 
between Beijing and ASEAN capitals have generally improved significantly, especially 
since the 1997-8 Asian financial and economic crisis. Finally, some Southeast Asian 
countries have recently been experiencing considerable political stresses on their 
respective home fronts and in their bilateral relations, making the region seem more 
unstable than only some years ago. Washington has decided to respond to these 
developments and challenges by promoting a coherent and stable ASEAN. This 
involves strengthening relations at the multilateral level and reinforcing bilateral 
cooperative relations. 
A PROMISING START
Immediately upon assuming office the Obama administration gave new prominence 
to relations with ASEAN. Crucial in this regard was the visit to Indonesia in February 
2009 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Framed in the context of a new era of 
diplomacy in the wider Asia, Clinton announced Washington’s intention to form a 
comprehensive partnership with Jakarta for advancing common interests on regional 
and global issues, including regional security, democracy promotion, trade, and 
climate change. Moreover, Clinton emphasized that the building partnership with 
Indonesia was a ‘critical step’ with respect to the US commitment to ‘smart power’ 
– a concept coined in contradistinction to the focus on hard power associated with 
the preceding Bush administration. She highlighted a new willingness on the part 
of Washington to listen to Southeast Asia’s governments, while also reaching out 
to their civil societies. Significantly, the Secretary of State paid an unprecedented 
visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to demonstrate America’s commitment 
to the Association, and held out the possibility of Washington acceding to the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Southeast Asia’s regional code of conduct. She 
also admitted to the failure of Washington’s policy of sanctions vis-à-vis Myanmar. 
In July 2009, with North Korea and the implementation of UN Security Resolution 
1874 very much on her mind, Secretary of State Clinton attended the 16th ASEAN 
Regional Forum. She also signed the instrument of accession to the Treaty of Amity 
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and Cooperation, announced the intended opening of a US mission to ASEAN, 
and conducted the first-ever ministerial meeting between the US and the countries 
of the Lower Mekong (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand). She assured the 
ASEAN and ARF Chair – Thailand – that Washington was interested in a broader, 
stronger and deeper relationship with Bangkok. In September, Clinton announced 
the outcome of the administration’s Burma policy review, which led the State 
Department to embark upon a policy of pragmatic engagement vis-à-vis Myanmar 
involving a high-level dialogue. In November 2009, when meeting leaders of the 
other Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies in Singapore, President 
Obama also participated in the inaugural ASEAN-US leaders’ meeting. Notably, 
the President vowed to strengthen US engagement in Southeast Asia both with 
individual allies and partners and with ASEAN as an institution. The President also 
indicated a commitment to a further round of leaders’ talks in 2010. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S REACTION
ASEAN countries have welcomed the Obama administration’s decision to engage 
more deeply with Southeast Asia. In particular, they have celebrated Washington’s 
resolution to upgrade the multilateral relationship with the Association. From a 
regional perspective, the grouping’s ties with Washington now resemble those 
already forged with other major powers. The US accession to the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation, which has been signed by more than 25 dialogue partners and 
states friendly with the grouping, has been regarded as particularly important, 
not least because the latter reinforces ASEAN’s preferred norms for interstate 
relations, including the non-use of force and the principle of non-interference. 
The US-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting at least puts the US on a par with China, Japan, 
India and Russia. Also, ASEAN countries have welcomed Washington’s decision to 
no longer let the Burmese tail wag the ASEAN dog in the sense that the perceived 
need to respond to events in Myanmar is no longer to come at the expense of 
relations with the Association as a whole. 
That said, Obama, self-titulated ‘America’s first Pacific President’, has probably not 
yet fully convinced sceptics that America’s substantive ties with the ASEAN states 
are set to change significantly. There is as yet no clearly articulated comprehensive 
strategy toward ASEAN. Moreover, to what extent Washington will henceforth really 
focus more on Southeast Asia is not certain. President Obama’s own November 
visit to East Asia again highlighted the importance Washington for good reasons 
attaches to Northeast Asia in so far as the President first visited Japan and - 
following his attendance at the APEC leaders’ meeting – then travelled to China 
and South Korea. The US security alliance remains at the core of US posture in 
the Asia-Pacific, and the tasks of managing the rise of China and dealing with 
North Korea will remain central to US Asia policy. The President was for a while 
expected to include Indonesia, where he lived as a boy, in his November 2009 
itinerary. This visit will now take place this year. 
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CHALLENGES FOR THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION
The Obama administration has indicated a 
desire to begin or reinforce cooperation with 
the ASEAN states in many areas: climate 
change, economics, trade, education, health, 
traditional diplomacy and security issues. 
It has also committed itself to support the 
establishment of the ASEAN Community by 
2015. Deepening cooperation with ASEAN 
as an organisation is not straightforward, 
however. There is, for instance, no obvious 
let alone unequivocally accepted leader within 
ASEAN that America could ask to shape the 
Association’s ties with Washington. Indeed, 
ASEAN countries may welcome a benign US 
role in Southeast Asia, but to some extent 
some also remain suspicious of American 
intentions. Member states espouse a range 
of interests and have to respond to different 
security and strategic pressures. 
The grouping itself faces numerous challenges 
in the quest to move toward regional 
integration, including significant political 
diversity, varying national compliance rates 
with regionally agreed objectives and a serious 
socio-economic divide between the early and 
later members of the Association. For the last 
two years, ASEAN’s cohesion and unity has to 
some degree also been called into question by 
what can only be described as extraordinary 
diplomatic tensions between some members, 
such as between Thailand and Cambodia. 
Notably, the ASEAN Charter, ratified in 2008, 
has brought about some important changes in 
the grouping’s workings, but the powers and 
role of the ASEAN Secretary-General remain 
circumscribed and the financial wherewithal 
made available to the Association by its 
members continues to be extremely modest. 
By strengthening cooperation with the 
Association, Washington can help the 
Association to regain some strategic weight, 
and contribute to regional development 
and stability. At the same time, the Obama 
administration may find it difficult to persuade 
ASEAN to change collective practices or 
to win new influence. Four examples can 
illustrate this. For instance, the US has invited 
members of the newly founded ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights to Washington, but taking into account 
acute intramural differences within Southeast 
Asia over its establishment and role, it is far 
from clear to what extent this step is likely 
to rapidly yield marked changes in ASEAN’s 
approach to the promotion and protection 
of human rights. 
Secondly, Washington is evidently interested 
in promoting the idea of a defence dialogue 
(and related cooperation) with ASEAN in 
the format of the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). So far, the 
ADMM-Plus has not taken off in practice 
and whether it will soon to do so is not clear. 
One requirement is that the ADMM-Plus 
country must have significant interactions 
with ASEAN defence establishments. This is 
not yet necessarily true for all ASEAN states, 
but the issue is that all ASEAN countries 
do need to endorse ADMM-Plus status. 
President Obama’s wish is also that the US 
engages with the East Asia Summit more 
formally. This may be easier to achieve given 
Washington’s recent accession to the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation. That said, ASEAN 
seems eager to maintain its centrality amid 
diverse proposals to build a new regional 
architecture. 
Thirdly, while the administration’s willingness 
to embark on the US Lower Mekong Initiative 
to assist with the development of the 
Indochinese states in particular is welcomed 
by the latter, it cannot be taken for granted 
that such moves will automatically serve other 
likely US purposes, such as limiting China’s 
presence and influence in this subregion. 
After all, Beijing has for some time sought to 
advance cooperation among the main political 
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players of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and also has high hopes for the 
Pan Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation Forum. In addition, China announced 
in October 2009 the provision of a US$15 billion loan for the development of 
infrastructure in the ASEAN region and the establishment of a US$10 billion 
China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund, the latter involving a private equity 
fund to support projects in the areas of infrastructure, energy and construction 
that are most likely to be relevant to mainland Southeast Asia. 
When it comes to further stimulating trade with Southeast Asia, President Obama 
may have announced that the US will engage the members of the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei 
Darussalam, and Chile) in their quest for a model trade agreement, but the US 
government’s enthusiasm for free trade is likely to be hobbled by the economic 
predicament it still faces. As such, free trade with Southeast Asia beyond what 
has already been agreed seems a rather distant prospect. 
BILATERAL RELATIONS
A further question is to what extent Washington can easily inject new momentum 
and substance into relationships with Southeast Asian allies and partners as well 
as put those with Myanmar on a new footing. As regards Thailand, for instance, 
the Obama administration seems quite concerned, at least privately, about the 
domestic political situation in Thailand; yet it sees limits to the extent to which it 
can be seen to comment on or even influence Thai domestic affairs. 
Relations with Indonesia, the only Southeast Asian country represented in the G-20, 
are likely to move ahead not only in field of financial and economic cooperation, 
as exemplified for example by the planned return of the US Peace Corps to the 
archipelago, notwithstanding the longstanding political sensitivities on the matter 
and the current domestic political context in which the administration of President 
Yudhoyono finds itself. However, in formulating their comprehensive partnership 
the two sides will need to bridge apparent differences over core issues such as 
the details of the future Asia-Pacific architecture, disarmament and proliferation, 
and the Middle East peace process. 
In developing other bilateral relationships, such as the one with Vietnam, the 
current ASEAN Chair, the US will have to remain sensitive to historical memories 
and Hanoi’s complicated ties with China. That said, the visit to Washington in 
December 2009 by Vietnamese Minister of Defense General Phung Quang Thanh, 
who continued the tradition started in 2000 by former US Secretary of Defence 
William Cohen to pursue reciprocal visits every three years, seems to have set the 
path for the further expansion of military-military cooperation. 
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MYANMAR
The Obama administration has been careful to point out that its objectives towards the military 
government remain essentially unchanged when compared to those of the Bush administration. 
President Obama has personally spelled out the precise conditions that Myanmar’s military government 
must meet in order for substantive bilateral relations to change: the release of all political prisoners, 
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; an end to conflicts with minority groups; and a genuine dialogue 
between the government, the democratic opposition and minority groups on shared vision of 
the future. Notwithstanding the positive response that the US Burma policy review has elicited in 
Naypyidaw in 2009, it is far from certain that Washington’s embrace of a high-level dialogue will 
produce the desired results. Myanmar’s military leadership has a record of following through with 
decisions and policies in pursuit of its perceived political-security imperative. It has also made clear 
that the 2008 Constitution is not to be altered in advance of the elections scheduled for this year. 
Equally, the military leadership sees no need for the kind of political process seemingly envisioned by 
Washington though Naypyidaw might hope that the US is able to persuade Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
to unambiguously change her public position on sanctions. Thus, while from America’s perspective 
the outcome of the newly instituted high-level dialogue is linked to the military’s willingness to 
accommodate American expectations and the need for some tangible results, Washington is likely 
to find that the State Peace and Development Council is going to remain disinclined to offer serious 
concessions unless these are perceived to be in the interest of the regime. 
CONCLUSION
The first year of the Obama administration has seen Washington expend significant efforts with 
a view to upgrading relations with the ASEAN countries. However, the region is very diverse both 
politically and as regards levels of socio-economic development, and this is likely to complicate 
US efforts to deepen ties. While regional expectations of President Obama remain high, political 
sensitivities and differences also persist. The symbolically important efforts undertaken hitherto by the 
Obama administration will need to be complemented in the next three years by further substantive 
measures if relations with the ASEAN countries are to be propelled to new heights with a view to 
re-consolidating America’s role in the region. 
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